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ABANDONED EQUITY AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: WHY ILLINOIS COURTS MUST RECOGNIZE SAME-
SEX PARENTS SEEKING VISITATION
LAURIE A. ROMPALA*
INTRODUCTION
A week ago, Alicia and Elijah's mother surprised the children by
picking them up from school and taking them on a trip to visit
relatives in New Mexico. Now very confused and anxious, the
children are ready to go home, and are demanding to know why
they cannot call their other mom.
For the thousands of American children like Elijah and Alicia,
there are few easy answers. Lesbian and gay parents are raising
children in greater numbers, yet their families, like many
contemporary American families, do not fit the mold of traditional
heterosexual marriages.' As a result, if the family breaks up,
traditional rules governing child custody and visitation2 do not neatly
encompass these family structures. When making custody or
visitation determinations, courts look to the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act3 ("IMDMA"), and are guided by an
overriding concern for the "best interests of the child." '4
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2000; B.A., Knox
College, 1994. This Note would not have been completed without the invaluable critical eye,
expertise, and good humor of Professor Katharine Baker. I am also grateful to my editors for
their assistance, endless patience, and encouragement.
1. See Nicole Berner, Child Custody Disputes Between Lesbians: Legal Strategies and
Their Limitations, 10 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 32 (1995) (citing ABA estimate that six to ten
million children are raised by lesbians or gay men); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That
Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like
Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 363 n.22 (1994) ("[Hlouseholds consisting of a husband, wife,
and their children constitute the minority of families with children ...."); Margaret Mahoney,
Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 38
(1984) (citing fifty-percent divorce rates for heterosexual marriages and increased divorce rates
for second marriages).
2. Visitation is derived from a custody proceeding and refers to maintaining continuing
contact with a child. See Eric G. Andersen, Children, Parents, and Nonparents: Protected
Interests and Legal Standards, 1998 BYU L. REV. 935, 953.
3. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101-601 (2000).
4. The best interests standard means that when the parents' desires conflict with the well-
being of the child, the court must rule in favor of what serves the child's best interests. Courts
have great discretion in making best interests determinations. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE
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Both statutes and common law tradition recognize a biological
parent's legal rights to his or her child. However, nonbiological
coparents are not considered in the traditional rules, and often have
no legal relationship to the child.' Yet nonbiological lesbian and gay
parents are increasingly demanding the right to maintain relationships
with their children.
Illinois courts engaging in a narrow reading of the IMDMA have
declared that these parents are legal strangers to their children.
Without standing, lesbian or gay coparents have no legal recourse to
maintain relationships with their children. Courts must broaden the
definition of parenthood to resolve these disputes in light of the best
interests of the children.
A petitioner must have standing, or a legally protectable interest,
to seek custody or visitation before a court will address the merits of
the petition. If the petitioner falls into one of the categories listed in
the IMDMA, she or he can easily establish standing. However,
coparents who do not fall neatly into one of the categories have a
more difficult time establishing standing and, consequently,
maintaining relationships with their children.
In the past, Illinois courts have adopted common law equitable
principles such as in loco parentis, de facto parent, and psychological
parent, to find standing for individuals who play significant parental
roles in a child's life, and who seek visitation.6 Recognizing that it
serves the best interests of the child, these courts have exercised their
equitable powers to find standing for individuals who are the practical
equivalent of parents. Nevertheless, they have not formulated a
consistent approach to standing issues for nonbiological parents. As a
result, lesbian and gay coparents who do not fall within a narrow
reading of the IMDMA may be barred from contact with their
children.
LAW OF DOMESTlC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 789 (2d ed. 1988). When making
custody and visitation decisions, Illinois courts consider a variety of factors including: the
custody preferences of the child's parents, the child's custody preferences, the child's
relationship with his or her family members, the child's interest in maintaining a stable home
and school environment, and the parent's willingness to facilitate a close relationship with the
other parent. See 750 IL-. COMP. STAT. 5/602 (2000).
5. Adoption is currently the only way a nonbiological coparent can create a permanent
legal relationship with his or her child.
6. See, e.g., Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (I11. App. Ct. 1996) (granting standing to
petitioner seeking visitation even though he was not the biological, adoptive, or foster father of
the child); In re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d 905 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (granting standing to stepmother
seeking visitation); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (granting standing
to grandparents seeking visitation).
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In In re C.B.L.,7 an Illinois appellate court was asked for the first
time to extend equitable standing to a lesbian nonbiological mother
seeking visitation of the child she had raised. She was equally
involved in the decision to have the child and she financially
supported the family after their daughter was born. Nevertheless, the
court refused to apply equitable principles to this case and declared
that the petitioner lacked standing under the visitation provision of
the IMDMA.8  In so holding, the C.B.L. court departed from its
history of recognizing parental relationships that fall outside the
scope of biology.
This Note will provide an overview of the unique legal issues
involved when lesbian or gay couples create families. It will also
present the legal realities facing nonbiological parents if the families
do not remain intact. Part I presents the complications resulting from
the creation of nontraditional families, focusing on same-sex families.
It will address the types of family structures affected, the legal
ramifications of chosen routes to parenthood,9 and the issues raised
when the parents end a romantic relationship with one another, but
intend to maintain their parental relationships with the children. Part
II will provide an overview of Illinois's treatment of standing in
custody and visitation disputes.10  It will discuss the historical
preference for biological parents and the judicial system's authority to
extend standing to parents who are "legal strangers" to their children.
Part III critiques the standards and reasoning used by the In re C.B.L.
court, and others in similar cases, to determine whether a
nonbiological parent has standing to petition for visitation. It
presents the reasons for extending equitable principles to lesbian or
gay nonbiological coparents seeking visitation. Finally, it will propose
a consistent approach to standing issues, focused on the best interests
of the child.
7. In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (II. App. Ct. 1999), reh'g denied, (Jan. 24, 2000).
& See id. at 320; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2000).
9. For example, it includes artificial insemination with known or unknown donors,
surrogacy, adoption, open adoptions, and second-parent adoptions.
10. While this Note will briefly address custody disputes, its primary focus is on the
standing of nonbiological parents to seek visitation of children they help raise. For a broader
review of custody and visitation rights relating to lesbian and gay parents, see Robin Cheryl
Miller, Annotation, Child Custody and Visitation Rights Arising from Same-Sex Relationships,
80 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001).
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I. NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
Lesbian and gay parents create a variety of family structures.11
Prior to the "gayby boom," the majority of lesbian or gay parents
became parents in the course of heterosexual relationships. 2
However, the number of planned lesbian and gay families has
dramatically increased.13  During the last decade, courts have
recognized lesbian and gay parents,14 numerous researchers have
educated the public about sexual orientation and parenting, 5 and
11. In 1990, estimates indicated that as many as ten million children are being raised in
lesbian or gay families. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional
Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990).
12. The custody and visitation battles faced by lesbian or gay parents with their former
heterosexual spouses present issues that are beyond the scope of this Note. However, there are
jurisdictions that adversely consider the lesbian or gay sexual orientation of the parent when
making custody or visitation determinations. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va.
1992) (holding that social condemnation for lesbians was an appropriate consideration and
transferring custody from lesbian mother to grandmother). See generally Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Lesbian & Gay Parenting: A Fact Sheet, at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=31 (last modified Sept. 28,
1997).
13. See Polikoff, supra note 11; see also Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra
note 12.
14. E.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999)
(applying doctrine of de facto parenthood and granting visitation to lesbian coparent); V.C. v.
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (granting nonbiological lesbian parent custody and visitation
because she was a "psychological parent" entitled to petition); Robano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959
(R.I. 2000) (finding standing for nonbiological lesbian mother and enforcing visitation
agreement). Even courts that fail to adequately assist lesbian or gay families acknowledge the
significance of their families. See In re Guardianship of Olivia J., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding error in the lower court's holding that, in a guardianship proceeding, a
nonbiological parent could not, as a matter of law, demonstrate that the biological parent's
custody was detrimental to the child); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 690 (Vt. 1997)
(refusing to find equitable basis for standing while stating "our opinion should not be read as
impeding same-sex partners from child-rearing or as minimizing the importance of maintaining
relationships between children and third parties with whom the children have formed significant
bonds"). Since Titchenal was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court declared that the state
could not exclude lesbian and gay citizens from the rights and privileges of marriage. See Baker
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Subsequently, the legislature enacted a "civil union"
system to extend these benefits, including access to the family law system, to lesbian and gay
citizens. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(d) (2001) ("[T]he law of domestic relations,
including annulment, separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property division
and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union."); 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (detailing
the revisions to each statute that pertains to civil unions).
15. See Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025,10 (reporting that children raised in lesbian or gay households and those raised in
heterosexual households have similar psychosocial development); NAT'L ASSN OF SOC.
WORKERS, SOCIAL WORK SPEAKS: NASW POLICY STATEMENTS 93, 162 (1988) (finding that
sexual orientation is not relevant to parenting ability); John J. Conger, Proceedings of the
American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the Year 1976: Minutes of the Annual
Meeting of the Council of Representatives, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 408, 432 (1977) (holding that
the sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation of natural or prospective adoptive parents should
not be the sole or primary consideration in child custody or placement cases).
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better reproductive technologies have been available to lesbian and
gay parents. 16  Complications relating to both the creation and
maintenance of the families accompany these trends.
A. Created Queer Families and Biological Parenthood
Jennifer and Miriam met and fell in love seven years ago. They
talked seriously about having children two years into their
relationship, after they had created a household together. They
agreed that Miriam would try to get pregnant through artificial
insemination. The couple wanted to ask their friend Noah to be the
donor and hoped to have him involved in their child's life.
However, they had heard horror stories about using known
donors-even if the man was a dear friend-and were concerned
about the ramifications of making that decision.
Jennifer and Miriam's story, although fictional, typifies the
concerns of lesbian or gay couples contemplating parenthood.
Different state laws apply depending on the method a couple uses to
create a family. Artificial insemination and surrogacy each require
different procedures and have different legal consequences.17 State
law will affect the decision of those couples that have the financial
and legal resources to choose from these options."'
1. Artificial Insemination
The Illinois Parentage Act19 governs the relationship between
children conceived by artificial insemination and their parents.
Under the Parentage Act, a child conceived through artificial
insemination is the legitimate and natural child of both the biological
mother and her husband.20 However, the husband must first consent
to the insemination and the procedure must take place in a licensed
physician's office.21  While the Illinois Parentage Act does not
specifically address lesbian couples, or even unmarried women in
general, it does clarify the legal relationship between the sperm donor
16. See Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family
Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1760-62 (1998).
17. For a comprehensive discussion of alternative reproduction, see Lori B. Andrews &
Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623 (1991).
18. Countless couples do not have this choice. While lesbian and gay parents share a
common sexual orientation, class, racial, gender, and cultural issues contribute to a disparity in
the practical options available to many prospective parents.
19. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1 (2000).
20. See id.
21. See id.
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and the child.12  As long as the sperm is provided to a licensed
physician for artificial insemination, the donor will not be legally
recognized as the child's biological parent.23
In this context, Jennifer and Miriam's decisions to use Noah, a
known donor, or to inseminate at home, or both, have serious legal
ramifications. If the couple decides to inseminate at home using
Noah's sperm, he may later legitimately claim that he is the father of
their child. His right to a relationship with the child will not
terminate unless he consents to a legal termination of his rights.
Jennifer and Miriam might avoid this problem if their physician
performs the insemination in a medical setting. However, if a known
donor's sperm is used, he might still be able to successfully assert his
paternity.2 4
But many prospective lesbian parents, facing a costly medical
and insurance process25 and the added barrier of sexual orientation
discrimination, 26 may decide to use a known donor and inseminate at
home. Unfortunately, they may not realize that their insemination
method can also create an unintentional legal relationship between
their child and the known donor.27 A couple and a known donor may
create a family in good faith and discuss the expectations of each
22. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(b) (2000).
23. See id.
24. But see Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding summary
judgment motion against donor seeking filiation order, where parties entered into written
agreement, and where Oregon statute terminates donor's parental rights). This is a potential
problem in Illinois, because Illinois's statute is not like Oregon's, which terminates all parental
rights of a man who donates semen to any woman besides his wife. See id.
25. Although Illinois is one of few states requiring insurance companies to cover infertility
treatment, lesbian couples may be forced to pay for artificial insemination out of pocket. See
generally American Society for Reproductive Medicine, State Infertility Insurance Laws, at
http://www.asrm.orgfPatients/insur.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). Typically, health insurance
plans are not required to cover infertility treatment (such as artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization) until after the prospective mother has unsuccessfully attempted to become
pregnant for one full year. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356(m), 125/5-3 (2000). Because lesbian
couples must use artificial insemination to become pregnant, regardless of whether there are
additional infertility problems, the couple must pay out of pocket, or lie about their infertility,
before any infertility treatment is covered. See, e.g., Robin Eisner & Paula Murphy, Two
Women and a Baby, Columbia University Graduate School of Jouranlism New Media
Workshop, at http://newmedia.jm.columbia.edu/1996/twomoms/insem2.html (last visited May
29, 2001) (discussing the expenses of insemination units and suggesting that a lesbian could
submit an infertility claim to her insurance company that states she had been unable to become
pregnant after months of unprotected sex).
26. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 12 (stating that surveys
reflect that only ten percent of doctors in the nation will inseminate an unmarried woman).
27. A legal parent must provide for the care and support of his or her child. In addition, he
or she can establish standing to seek visitation or custody of the child. On the other hand,
support obligations could be imposed on the donor, even if he had never agreed to take on these
parental duties.
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party in advance. However, the individuals may feel differently about
their agreement after the child's birth or if the relationship with the
other involved adults changes. In either situation, both biological and
legal relationships then become paramount. 28
2. Surrogacy
Taylor and Mel have always wanted to have children. Over the
course of their ten-year friendship with Margaret, playful
conversations about her carrying their child have developed into a
serious decision. Unlike Taylor and Mel, Margaret has never
wanted to make the constant commitment to child raising that
parenthood demands. However, she is willing to carry the child,
and is content to play the favorite aunt and babysitter. Margaret
conceived through artificial insemination with Mel and is now six
months pregnant with the couple's child. When the child is born,
Margaret will give up her legal parental rights and Taylor will adopt
the baby.
Unlike a lesbian couple in which one parent carries the
pregnancy to term, gay men who wish to become biological parents
must rely upon a surrogate mother. In Illinois, no statutory provision
exists for gay parents who have a surrogate carry their child.29 A
growing number of other states have enacted statutes declaring
surrogacy agreements void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy.30
The legislature recently revised the Illinois Parentage Act of
198431 to identify the legal relationships between a surrogate mother,
the child, and the heterosexual married couple whose egg and sperm
were inseminated in the surrogate.32  As a result of the revisions,
28. Parenting agreements are rarely enforceable in the face of a clear biological, and thus
legal, parental relationship between an adult and a child. See infra Part II.C.
29. See Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-gay
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183, 203-07
(1995).
30. See id. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal
Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995).
31. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 (2000).
32. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/6 (providing that a legal relationship between the
biological parents and the child before the child's birth, requires satisfaction of six
preconditions: (1) the surrogate must acknowledge that she is not the biological parent and that
she is carrying the biological mother and father's child; (2) if the surrogate is married, her
husband must acknowledge that he is not the biological father and that the child is the biological
parents'; (3) the egg used to conceive the child must be the biological mother's; (4) the sperm
used to conceive the child must belong to the biological father, and not the surrogate's husband
or partner; (5) a licensed physician must certify to each of the above conditions; and (6) all of
the certifications must be in writing, witnessed by uninvolved parties, and filed with the Illinois
Department of Public Health).
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heterosexual married couples may legally- establish a parental
relationship prior to the birth of a child carried by a surrogate.33 The
parties must satisfy the statutory requirements to overcome the
rebuttable presumption that the child belongs to the surrogate
mother and her husband. 34
Certainly these revisions help enforce family creation
agreements between married couples and surrogate mothers, but they
fail to protect nontraditional families who wish to avail themselves of
surrogacy. For example, a gay couple may use an anonymous egg
donor and one partner's sperm to conceive a child. If that couple
enters into a surrogacy agreement with a different woman, they
cannot legally prevent her from claiming to be the biological mother
of the child. In the above example, Taylor, Mel, and Margaret
carefully considered the surrogacy arrangement long before she
became pregnant. Nevertheless, Margaret has an enforceable legal
right to the child she is carrying, until she gives up that right after the
baby's birth. 35 Because there are far fewer legal protections for gay
men creating families, in some ways, surrogacy presents a riskier
entry into parenthood than artificial insemination.36 One solution is
to extend the statute to place gay men in the same position as
heterosexual married couples when entering into surrogacy
arrangements. In other words, the biological father of the child
carried by the surrogate should retain his full parental rights even if
the surrogate is married and attempts to assert parental rights to the
child. In this way, the surrogate will not be able to bar the biological
father from establishing a legal relationship with his child. Even if the
courts are unwilling to extend this protection to both the
nonbiological and the biological father, it will at least place gay
coparents in the same position as lesbian coparents who adhere to the
statutory requirements of providing sperm to a licensed physician for
insemination. Barring this option, unless surrogate mothers, and the
couples whose children they carry, strictly adhere to their agreements,
gay couples remain vulnerable to losing the families that they create. 37
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. The Illinois Adoption Act requires morc than seventy-two hours to pass before a
woman's consent to adoption will be effective. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/9 (2000).
36. See Hollandsworth, supra note 29.
37. See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., PROTECTING FAMILIES:
STANDARDS FOR CHILD CUSTODY IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS (1999); see also
Hollandsworth, supra note 29, at 206 n.102 (discussing other difficulties facing gay men using
surrogacy to create families).
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B. Adoption
Other couples may choose adoption as a route to parenthood.
Illinois follows a neutral approach to sexual orientation in adoption.38
In In re K.M., the court permitted a lesbian coparent to adopt her
partner's biological child, without requiring the biological mother to
give up her parental rights.39 The court announced that "nothing in
the [Illinois Adoption] Act suggests that sexual orientation is a
relevant consideration, and lesbians and gay men are permitted to
adopt in Illinois."40
Three types of adoption 41 are relevant to lesbian and gay parents:
agency adoptions, private adoptions, and "second-parent"
adoptions.42 Agency adoptions include situations where a lesbian or
gay man adopts a foster child placed in her or his home by a state
welfare agency.43  Private adoptions include both "stranger"
adoptions and "open" adoptions." Stranger adoptions occur where
an unrelated individual or a married couple adopts a child after the
biological parents have given up their parental rights.45 In open
adoptions, the biological parent relinquishes his or her parental rights
in favor of the adoptive parents, but may be allowed contact with the
child postadoption. 46 Finally, "second-parent" adoptions are similar
to stepparent adoptions, where the biological parent need not
relinquish his or her parental rights for the coparent to adopt the
child.47  Each type of adoption recognizes and creates a legal
38. See In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d. 888, 892 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995) (allowing joint
adoption petition by unmarried same-sex parents to adopt one parent's biological child).
Significantly, courts adopted this approach less than five years ago when the first second-parent
adoption petition was brought in Illinois. See id.; see also In re Marriage of R.S., 677 N.E.2d
1297 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (reversing change of custody from mother involved in lesbian
relationship and declaring that "Illinois' approach to child custody determinations is sexual
orientation neutral").
39. See Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d at 898.
40. Id. at 892.
41. Most state laws also provide for adoption by family members, or other blood relatives.
See generally Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State Court
Opinions, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1497, 1503 (1998). The Adoption Act provides for adoption of
related children by family members. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (2000).
42. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., ADOPTION BY LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW IN THE 50 STATES 1 (1996).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. One distinction lies in the legal relationship between the stepparent and the biological
parent. Stepparents adopting their spouse's children have a legally recognized relationship-
marriage-with the biological parent. Lesbian or gay second-parents do not have a legally
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relationship between a child and an individual who is not his or her
biological parent. Adoption by lesbian or gay parents may be
hindered by lack of appropriate legislation or by cultural bias against
the creation of these legal relationships.
1. Agency Adoptions
Same-sex couples or individual lesbian or gay men may choose to
become foster parents. After living with a family for the duration
proscribed by statute, a foster child may be eligible for adoption. 48
Before a child welfare agency will place a child in foster care, the
prospective foster parents must be approved. Prior to approval, the
agency will investigate the prospective foster parent's personal life,
living environment, and lifestyle. Prospective lesbian or gay foster
parents may be denied the opportunity to adopt, regardless of their
parenting skills, simply because of their sexual orientation.49 For
example, an agency investigator might be personally prejudiced
against lesbian or gay people and believe them to be inherently unfit
to parent. That investigator could withhold approval of the
application based on a fabricated reason, such as a messy house or a
bad temperament, even if the actual reason was anti-gay animus5 0
Thus, even in Illinois, where considerations of sexual orientation
alone in adoption or foster care decisions is against the law, a
prospective lesbian or gay foster parent might never have the
opportunity to raise a child in his or her home.51
2. Private Adoptions
Both Taylor and Mel were in the delivery room when Margaret
gave birth to their daughter. Margaret threw a party for the family
after the adoption process was completed and Taylor was legally
the baby's father. Maggie, now eleven, spends two weeks every
summer visiting with her Aunt Margaret in California. She lives
with both of her fathers during the rest of the year.
recognizable relationship to their spouse, who is the biological parent.
48. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supro note 12, at 4 (noting that
agency foster care is designed to reunite children with their natural parents, and is not a
recommended method of adoption).
49. See id. (discussing a lesbian couple's complaint against Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services after it denied their foster parent application).
50. See id.
51. See id.; see also In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d. 888, 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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Private adoptions may also be obstructed by the private biases of
individuals at the agencies and the courts. 2 All private adoptions
require court approval. 3 If a couple is using a private agency, they
must receive prior agency approval of the adoption before they ever
reach the courtroom.5 4 Just as a public agency investigator could
fabricate a reason to deny approval to lesbian or gay parents, so could
private agencies or judges.55 In a particularly egregious second parent
adoption case, one Illinois circuit court judge sua sponte appointed an
anti-gay organization as a "secondary guardian" to the children and
released confidential information about the parties to the
organization, because she believed that its position that "homosexual
lifestyle[s] are not in the best interests of children" was necessary to
evaluate the case.56
Private adoptions can also be expensive and protracted. 7 The
current adoption law does not permit unmarried couples to adopt
jointly. 8 In Illinois, lesbian and gay couples cannot marry. 9 One
practical effect of this restriction on adoption law is that each parent
must adopt the child separately.6° Once the court approves of one
52. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 12, at 5 (discussing biases
of agencies, court-appointed investigators, and judges).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id; see also In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (reversing anti-gay
judge's vacation of lesbian coparent's adoption petitions).
56. C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d at 678. Fortunately, the judge's conduct has been severely
criticized by the Illinois judiciary. In addition to reversal of her decisions by the Appellate
Court, the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board had filed an eight-count complaint against the judge
for her conduct, which the board described as "prejudicial to the administration of justice and
conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute." Complaint, In re Judge Susan J. McDunn,
No. 01-CC-2, (Cts. Comm'n of the State of I1l.) (fied Feb. 2, 2001).
57. See Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A
Social Science Perspective, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191 (1995) (discussing barriers to
adoption).
58. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (2000). However, an unmarried couple may bring a
joint adoption petition if one partner is the child's biological parent. See In re Petition of K.M.,
653 N.E.2d. 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
59. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2000) (prohibiting marriage between two individuals
of the same sex).
60. See Starr, supra note 41, at 1505. One author has proposed joint adoption by two
unmarried, nonromantically involved adults as an alternative to the rigid construction of the
rule permitting only individuals or married couples to adopt. See Angela Mae Kupenda, Two
Parents Are Better Than None: Whether Two Single, African American Adults (Who Are Not in
a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with Each Other) Should Be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and
Co-Parent African American Children, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703, 713 (1997). The
author cited reasons for supporting joint adoptions (including stable relationship and home, the
parents' equal commitment to child rearing, community and extended family support, and the
best interests of the child), and support for this alternative model in the lesbian and gay
community, as the basis for her argument. See id. at 714. Unfortunately, in attempting to
bolster her proposed model, the author implicitly supports the homophobic reasons that joint
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parent's adoption, the couple can begin the process of petitioning for
a second-parent adoption. This double-adoption process is time
consuming and costly.
Unlike many private adoptions, open adoption is a process that
allows the adoptive parents and the biological parent(s) to know each
other. The parental rights of known sperm donors or surrogates are
terminated in favor of the adoptive parents. Thus, open adoption
creates a legal relationship between the nonbiological coparents and
the child, like other forms of adoption.61 The distinction here lies in
the adoptive parents' decision to allow the biological parent to
develop some form of relationship with their child, without a legal
obligation to do so. Thus, for both Jennifer and Miriam, and Taylor
and Mel, open adoption will legitimate and enforce the parties'
parental agreement, regardless of whether the couple intends to
involve the surrogate or donor in the child's life.
In some cases, couples that face sexual orientation discrimination
by agencies, investigators, or judges attempt to adopt children from
outside of the United States.62 In recent years, there has been a surge
in international stranger adoptions by lesbian and gay individuals.63
However, if the child's home country discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation, a lesbian or gay couple may face the same barriers
as at home.64
adoptions have been denied to lesbian and gay parents. See id. at 715-16. She states that
[r]easons to deny joint adoptions based on the sexual orientation of the potential co-
parents are myriad: fear that a homosexual parent will molest the child; fear that the
child will become homosexual from the co-parents' influence... and belief that the
developmental needs of a child require a stable heterosexual household
and, without addressing the validity of this laundry list, argues that her proposed model should
be readily accepted because the relationship between her proposed coparents is not sexual or
romantic. Id. (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the author fails to recognize that
lesbians and gay men may also choose to coparent in stable, nonsexual relationships.
61. Anecdotal evidence suggests that courts are most willing to grant lesbians and gay men
adoptions of orphaned blood relatives. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC.,
supra note 42, at 5.
62. See Christensen, supra note 16, at 1407; see also Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., Overview of State Adoption Laws, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=399 (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (noting that "while it would
appear that a lesbian or gay man should be permitted to adopt a child in all states, the reality is
that in many, their petitions for adoption will be denied, if they even get that far along in the
process").
63. Before an individual can adopt a foreign-born orphan, he or she must apply to the INS
for an orphan petition. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(F) (2001). The adoptive parent may be
screened in the home country of the child as well as by the courts in the United States. See
LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 42, at 6.
64. See LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUC. FUND, INC., supra note 42, at 6. For example,
in countries like China, where the status of being lesbian or gay may be criminalized, an open
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3. Second-Parent Adoption
Illinois permits second-parent adoptions to protect the legal
relationship between a nonbiological parent and his or her child.65 A
second-parent adoption is like a stepparent adoption in that the
biological parent joins the nonbiological parent's adoption petition. 6
The biological parent must consent to adoption but is not required to
relinquish his or her parental rights.67 Because a nonbiological parent
is not automatically accorded legal rights to his or her child, the
availability of second-parent adoptions is essential to protect the
relationship between that parent and child. Where second-parent
adoptions are not legal, many nonbiological parents cannot legally
protect their relationships with their children.68 Thus, second-parent
adoption is currently the best solution for intact same-sex families,
with two caveats. First, it must be a legal option in the home state of
the parents. Second, there also must be no other biological parent
who claims parental rights, including known donors or surrogates.
C. Maintaining Created Families
Families created by lesbian and gay parents rarely have a legal
safety net. Without adoption or a biological link, a nonbiological
parent has few legally cognizable rights to the child. Consequently,
the dissolution of a same-sex family with children can be damaging to
the parents as well as the children. In response to this crisis, in early
1999, a number of national lesbian and gay organizations created a set
lesbian couple might have their adoption petition denied, but a single lesbian might have no
difficulty.
65. See In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d. 888 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (seminal second-parent
adoption case by lesbian coparent in Illinois). While this option is increasingly available
nationwide, more than half the states still do not allow second-parent adoptions. Twenty-one
state courts at various levels have permitted second-parent adoptions by lesbian or gay
coparents. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., supra note 62; see, e.g.,
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (first second-parent adoption case in
Massachusetts); Adoption of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (seminal second-
parent adoption case). There are a few states that explicitly prohibit adoptions by lesbian and
gay parents. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (2000); OKLA. STAT. § 10-7007-1.4 (2000) (stating
that one goal of the Child Welfare System Reform Review Committee is to prohibit adoption
by lesbian or gay persons). New Hampshire's similar prohibition was repealed in 1999. See
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4, 170-F:6 (2000).
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 12.
68. See generally GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., supra note 37. In
many respects, this was the problem in C.B.L., because A.B. and H.L. lived in a state where
second-parent adoption was not legal. See In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (I11. App. Ct. 1999),
reh'g denied, (Jan. 24, 2000).
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of model standards for same-sex couples that have children. 69 The
organizations developed the model standards to encourage same-sex
families to adhere to their original intentions and agreements. The
standards, while nonbinding, are necessary to protect not only the
interests of nonbiological parents, but more importantly, to ensure
that children raised by same-sex parents can preserve stable
relationships with their parents.
1. Parenting Agreements
Miriam, Jennifer, and Noah had extensive discussions about who
would be the child's parents and the extent of Noah's involvement
in the baby's life. They drafted parenting agreements and detailed
each party's expectations and promises in the contract. However,
as the end of Joey's first year approached, Noah still refused to
relinquish rights as the biological father so that Jennifer could
complete the second-parent adoption of the baby.
Many lesbian mothers who choose to involve the donor in their
child's life face the same situation as Miriam and Jennifer.70 Lesbian
and gay parents may create parenting agreements with each other and
with known donors or surrogates whom they want to have limited
involvement in their child's life. Courts may or may not enforce these
agreements.71  Courts refusing to extend equitable parental rights to
nonbiological parents reason that a biological parent cannot contract
away his or her constitutional rights.72 Nevertheless, formalizing the
agreement outlines the expectations and promises of each involved
adult before the child is born.73 Courts also tend to favor biological
69. See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., supra note 37.
70. See Thomas v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d
356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). In Thomas, the trial court rejected the donor's paternity petition
based on a theory of equitable estoppel. Unfortunately, the appellate court reversed, giving
undue weight to the biological connection between Thomas and the child. For a more in-depth
discussion of the implications of this case, see Christensen, supra note 16, at 1399-1405.
71. Compare Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991) (refusing to enforce
coparenting agreement between lesbian parents and regarding visitation petition as a challenge
to the biological mother's parental fitness), with A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664-65 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1992) (enforcing the parenting agreement between lesbian coparents where evidence
showed that the parties jointly decided to have and raise a child together). Sporleder was
subsequently overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Holtzman v. Knott, 516 U.S. 975 (1995),
when the court applied its equitable powers to grant a lesbian coparent standing to seek
visitation.
72. See, e.g., Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied,
760 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2000) (former partner denied visitation of child she coparented); Thomas S.
v. Robin Y., 209 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (sperm donor permitted to bring paternity
action); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio C.C. 1994) (sperm donor permitted to bring
paternity action).
73. See GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., supra note 37, at 5.
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parents, regardless of whether the only substantial contribution made
by the "biological parent" was sperm or an egg for conception.
Although a couple and a known donor created a parenting
agreement, if the donor later sues for custody or visitation, courts
have generally ruled in favor of the donor.74 Similarly, when a lesbian
couple creates a family without a known donor, courts do not enforce
coparenting agreements. 75  Unfortunately, courts accepting this
narrow perspective reject the reality of planned parenthood by
lesbian and gay individuals.
There is no evidence to suggest that same-sex couples are not
deciding to have children in the face of these risks. Even if a court
might not enforce a parenting agreement, formalizing the agreement
in writing will outline the expectations and promises of each involved
adult before the child is born.76  If the parties are later locked in
disagreement about parenting rights and obligations, or are involved
in mediation, a written agreement can serve as a concrete and specific
reminder about their respective moral obligations to one another and
to the child they brought into the world.
2. Custody and Visitation Disputes
In adjudicating custody and visitation disputes between same-sex
parents, courts have typically addressed a scenario just like that found
in In re C.B.L., where a lesbian couple plans a family together and
one partner is the biological parent. Although the couple may sign a
coparenting agreement and share all parenting duties, they do not
petition for a second-parent adoption.7   At the end of the
relationship, the couple informally agrees to a custody or visitation
74. See id.; cf Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding summary
judgment motion against donor seeking filiation order, where parties entered into written
agreement, and where Oregon statute terminates donor's parental rights).
75. See, e.g., Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202 (refusing to enforce coparenting
agreement between lesbian parents and regarding visitation petition as a challenge to biological
mother's parental fitness).
76. See GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., supra note 37, at 5. In
some instances, the court will give greater consideration to an existing parenting contract. See,
e.g., L.A.L. v. D.A.L., 714 So. 2d 595 (Fla. App. Ct. 1998) (quashing order granting donor
paternity test where donor had entered into contract disavowing any parental rights); J.A.L. v.
E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996) (parenting agreement documents considered by court
in evaluating nonbiological mother's standing).
77. In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), reh'g denied, (Jan. 24, 2000); see also
Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997). Ironically, in each case, the court criticized the
nonbiological parent for not seeking a second-parent adoption. Unfortunately, a second parent
adoption is available only if the biological parent joins the petition, which is unlikely where the
couple has separated and custody or visitation is contested.
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agreement. If the arrangement becomes burdensome to the
biological mother, she terminates visitation. Most frequently in same-
sex families, when the biological parent unilaterally terminates
visitation, the coparent seeks restored contact with the child. If the
coparents cannot work out an acceptable arrangement, the
nonbiological parent's only recourse is litigation.
The nonbiological parent then seeks redress in court.78  The
IMDMA, and other statutes designed to address custody and
visitation disputes, frequently provide no assistance to nontraditional
family structures.79 For lesbian and gay families, using (and misusing)
the legal system can be a self-destructive strategy. Biological parents
who invoke existing laws that exclude nonbiological parents from
their families tear their families apart and create bad law for other
families. 80
II. ILLINOIS'S HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CUSTODY AND
VISITATION DISPUTES
Historically, courts have accorded special protection to the
relationships between children and their biological parents.81 Parents
must provide support and care for their offspring.82  Even if the
relationship between the biological parents ends, this moral and legal
obligation persists.83  The biological parent-child relationship is
78. See Guardianship of Z.C.W, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied sub
nom. Crandall v. Wagner, 528 U.S. 1056 (1999) (former partner of biological mom not
permitted to seek visitation); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(former partner denied visitation of child she coparented); In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (I11.
App. Ct. 1999), reh'g denied, (Jan. 24, 2000) (former partner denied standing to seek visitation
of child); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (lesbian coparent entitled to visitation
of child); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (former partner of lesbian biological mom
was entitled to visitation).
79. One proposed alternative is to encourage former same-sex partners who create families
to commit to the process of mediation to settle their disputes. See William Mason Emnett,
Queer Conflicts: Mediating Parenting Disputes Within the Gay Community, 86 GEO. L.J. 433
(1997).
80. See GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET AL., supra note 37.
81. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) ("[Tjhe Court has found that the
relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to
constitutional protection.") (citations omitted); Santosky v. Cramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (a
termination of parental rights case stating: "parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution
of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those
resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs"); Hock v. Hock, 365 N.E.2d 1025, 1027
(I11. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that "[i]t is in the best interests of a child to have a healthy and
close relationship with both parents").
82. See Parker v. Parker, 81 N.E.2d 745, 747 (I11. App. Ct. 1948) (citations omitted).
83. Id.
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protected because of the fundamental belief that a child's best
interest is served by stable, continued relationships with his or her
parents. 84
A. Statutes Governing Custody and Visitation
The IMDMA governs most child custody and visitation
determinations.8 5  However, the Probate Act, 86 The Juvenile Court
Act of 1987,87 and the Adoption Act 88 all give courts authority to
adjudicate custody and visitation issues. These statutes codify the
common law presumption that biological parents are entitled to the
care, custody, and control of their children. The statutes also govern
disputes between biological parents and unrelated third parties about
visitation or custody issues.89 At the same time, courts continue to
rely on common law principles to address custody and visitation
disputes falling outside the ambit of these statutes.9°
Under the superior rights doctrine, biological parents' rights are
preferred over custody or visitation claims by unrelated third
parties.91 However, biological parents' rights to their children are not
absolute. 2 Proof that their parental claims do not serve the best
interests of the children will overcome their presumed rights.93
84. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that biological parents have a
fundamental and constitutional right to raise their own children); Hock, 365 N.E.2d at 1027.
85. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (2000). Normally, the IMDMA is invoked when a
heterosexual marriage is ending and there are children in the family. See id.
86. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 (2000) (governing legal guardianship proceedings initiated
by "any interested person").
87. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1 (2000) (governing custody and visitation proceedings
where the biological parent is allegedly unfit).
88. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/0.01 (2000) (for proceedings to terminate the parental rights
of biological parents in favor of a third party).
89. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601-07 (2000); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1; 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/1-1; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/0.01.
90. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000); T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873 (Penn. 2000) (proper to find standing for nonbiological
parent seeking visitation); Robano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421(Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 (1995) (court adopted
equitable parent doctrine to evaluate visitation and custody claims brought by nonbiological
parents).
91. See In re Barnhart, 597 N.E.3d 1238, 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
92. See In re Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1151 (Ill. 1986); In re Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231,
1234 (I11. 1981).
93. See Townsend, 427 N.E.2d at 1234. In some cases, even though the biological parent is
fit, a court may decide that the children's best interests are served by granting custody to a third
party. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brownfield, 670 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (court
granted stepmother custody of children, over biological mother's objections).
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There are important distinctions between custody and visitation.
Legal custody entitles a parent to greater control over a child's
upbringing, and therefore, there are greater safeguards that
accompany custody. 94 Visitation, on the other hand, is the legal right
to maintain a continuing relationship with a child. 95 Because of this
distinction, legislatures and courts recognize that a broader array of
individuals deserve to maintain significant relationships with children.
With this understanding, Illinois courts have granted visitation rights
to grandparents, 96 nonbiological parents, putative parents,97 and
stepparents. 8
Before a person may petition for custody or visitation of a child,
he or she must establish standing under the applicable statute. Under
the IMDMA, a nonparent must meet the requirements of section
601(b)(2) to establish standing to seek custody.99 In relevant part,
section 601(b) provides that:
A child custody proceeding is commenced in the court: (1) by a
parent, by filing a petition ... (ii) for custody of the child, in the
county in which he is permanently resident or found; or (2) by a
person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the
child in the county in which he is permanently resident or found,
but only if he is not in the physical custody of one of his parents. 1°°
Several courts have considered the issue of what constitutes
physical custody of a child. Physical custody requires more than
94. See Andersen, supra note 2, and accompanying text; see also Michael H. v. Gerard D.,
491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989) (additional citation omitted) (discussing the rights attached to
custody).
95. See Andersen, supra note 2; see also Michael H. v. Gerard D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19
(1989) (additional citation omitted) (discussing the rights attached to custody).
96. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme Court reviewed Washington
State's broad visitation statute, and determined that a child's grandparents were not entitled to
seek visitation where they had not demonstrated any unfitness on the part of the parent. The
Court concluded that the visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the parents' rights
to make childrearing decisions. Shortly thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a
challenge to section 607 of the IMDMA, which allows for visitation by grandparents. See Lulay
v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521 (I11. 2000). In Lulay, over the objection of both of the parents, the
grandparents sought visitation subsequent to the parents' divorce. Rather than address the
facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality, the court issued an extremely narrow holding,
finding that, as applied in this case, the provision unconstitutionally infringed upon the parents'
fundamental right to make childrearing decisions.
97. A putative parent is the alleged fathei of an illegitimate child.
9& See Brownfield, 670 N.E.2d at 1200 (finding that a biological mother had voluntarily
relinquished custody and granting the stepmother custody of the children after their father
died); In re Marriage of Carey, 544 N.E.2d 1293, 1299 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Cebrezynski v.
Cebrezynski, 379 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
99. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2) (2000) (standing requirement for custody of a child).
100. Id.
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actual possession of the child at the time that the petition is filed.101
There is a clear distinction between legal custody and mere physical
custody. Determining legal custody requires findings regarding who
has actual possession of the child, how that custody was obtained,
how long that individual has had the child, and the nature of the
custodial relationship between the individual and the child.Y02
A nonparent can usually establish standing under section
602(b)(2) under one of two circumstances. 10 3 The first is when the
parent has voluntarily given up control and custody of the child1 °4
The second is where the child has lived with the nonbiological parent
for a "substantial period of time," 105 and a custody change would not
serve the best interests of the child.' °6 These two situations have
typically applied to stepparents07 or grandparents1 8 who become
primary caregivers for the child.
101. See In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that
grandparents whose daughter and granddaughter were living with them at the time of their
daughter's death did not have physical custody of the child under section 601(b)(2)); In re
Custody of Cannon, 645 N.E.2d 348, 351 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
102 See In re Marriage of Houghton, 704 N.E.2d 409, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Cannon, 645
N.E.2d at 351.
103. See Cannon, 645 N.E.2d at 352.
104. See id. at 352; In re Rudsell, 684 N.E.2d 421, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (family friends had
standing to gain custody because the mother had left her child with the family with only
intermittent visitation over a course of several years); Look v. Look, 315 N.E.2d 623, 626 (I11.
App. Ct. 1974) (child remained in custody of maternal grandparents because the father did not
seek custody for a number of years); see also In re Kirschner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995) (the now
infamous "Baby Richard" case, holding that voluntary relinquishment is required to establish
nonparent standing under section 601(b)(2)).
105. See Cannon, 645 N.E.2d at 352.
106. The same standing requirement applies to petitions under the Probate Act. See In re
Barnhart, 597 N.E.3d 1238, 1239 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (guardianship petition by grandmother did
not satisfy standing requirements of section 601(b)(2)). If the nonparent cannot meet the
requirements of section 601(b)(2), that individual may attempt to satisfy the more stringent
standing requirements of the Adoption or Juvenile Court Acts. See Peterson, 491 N.E.2d at
1152; Cannon, 645 N.E.2d at 351; In re Marriage of Nicholas, 524 N.E.2d 728, 731 (I11. App. Ct.
1988) (remanding for determination of who had physical custody of the child at the mother's
death). The courts have noted that the statutes require proof that the biological parents are
"unfit" or that they have voluntarily relinquished custody of the child.
107. See Brownfield, 670 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 (I1l. App. Ct. 1996); In re Marriage of Carey, 544
N.E.2d 1293,1299 (Il. App. Ct. 1989); Cebrezynski v. Cebrezynski, 379 N.E.2d 713 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (intervener stepmother was granted custody of child, even though the biological mother
was found to be a fit parent).
108. See In re Custody of Menconi, 453 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (father had
voluntarily relinquished custody of the child to the grandparents for a substantial period of
time); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652, 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (grandparents had standing
to seek visitation). But see Peterson, 491 N.E.2d at 1153 (dismissing grandparents custody
petition for lack of standing); Houghton, 704 N.E.2d at 413 (reversing order giving maternal
grandmother custody of child where father had not relinquished legal custody).
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Individuals seeking visitation must also first establish standing.' °9
Section 607 of the IMDMA, which governs visitation petitions,
provides that:
(a) a parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to
reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing,
that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical,
mental, moral or emotional health....
(b)(1) The court may grant reasonable visitation privileges to a
grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling of any minor child upon
petition to the court by the grandparent, great-grandparent, or
sibling.... if the court determines that it is in the best interests and
welfare of the child .... 110
There is no standing requirements set out in this section. For
purposes of visitation determinations, courts generally refer to the
standing requirements of section 601 and 602.111 Even if reasonable
visitation by nonbiological parents may be granted in more
circumstances than custody, petitioners must still meet the more
stringent standing requirements of section 601. Despite this threshold
requirement, courts have found standing to seek visitation in cases
where a continued, stable environment would serve the best interests
of the child." 2
B. Equitable Principles Governing Custody and Visitation
Aside from statutory requirements, courts have general equity
power to make custody and visitation decisions based on the best
interests of children."3  This authority dates back to the state's
common law duty to act as parens patriae for those who cannot care
for themselves. 114 Grandparents, stepparents, foster parents, and the
109. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2001).
110. Id. The viability of section 607(b)(1) remains unclear in light of Lulay. The court's
analysis focused primarily on the legislative history of the IMDMA and the exceptions set out in
the statute. Taken together with the appellate court's decision in In re C.B.L., the strict
construction of the statute does not bode well for nontraditional families appealing to the
court's equity power.
111. See Slayton v. Strappe, 685 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
112. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Henderson, 382 N.E.2d 650, 653 (11. App. Ct. 1978) (putative
father could not overcome determination that remaining with grandmother served the child's
best interests). See infra Part III, for a discussion of the best interests standard and visitation
standing.
113. See Parker v. Parker, 81 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1948); N.Y. Life v. Bangs, 103
U.S. 435, 438 (1880); Cowls v. Cowls, 8 I11. (3 Gilm.) 435, 436-37 (1846).
114. The phrase parens patriae refers to the "role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under legal disability, such as juveniles.... It is the principle that the state must care for
those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody
from their parents." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
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unmarried partners of either same-or opposite-sex biological parents
may all be the practical, psychological, and actual parents of a child,
though courts have not consistently recognized their relationships.
Where a nonbiological parent does not meet the statutory
requirements for standing to seek visitation or custody, courts may
find other bases for standing."5 For example, courts have used
various equitable doctrines to find that a nonbiological parent has
standing based on their psychological parent," 6 in loco parentis, or de
facto parent status."7
1. Standing of Unmarried Biological Parent
Under Illinois statute n8 and in equity, an unmarried biological
parent has standing to seek visitation of his or her child." 9 Standing is
rooted in the parents' "substantial and cognizable interest in the
custody and care" of their children1l 0 In Elmore, the court held that a
habeas corpus proceeding was a proper avenue for an unmarried
father to reach a best interests hearing. 2' The equitable parent
doctrine looks to the relationship between the presumed biological
parent and the child, and whether it serves the best interests of
children to establish standing for custody and visitation. 22
115. See, e.g., Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868, 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (court used
equitable parent doctrine to grant visitation to petitioner who had developed a father-daughter
relationship with child).
116. In Temple v. Meyer the court stated:
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through
interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The psychological parent may
be a biological... adoptive, foster or common-law ... parent, or any other person.
There is no presumption in favor of any of these after the initial assignment at
birth....
544 A.2d 629, 632 n.3 (Conn. 1988) (quoting J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 98 (1979)).
117. Some courts distinguish between de facto and in loco parentis standing. However, as
applied, there is little practical distinction between the two doctrines. Thus, for purposes of this
Note, the terms have been used interchangeably.
118. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-1 (2000).
119. See Koelle, 672 N.E.2d at 872; In re Upmann, 558 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(granting custody to unmarried father of child); People ex rel. Elmore v. Elmore, 361 N.E.2d
615, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
120. Upmann, 558 N.E.2d at 572.
121. See Elmore, 361 N.E.2d at 617.
122. See In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344, 1349 (In. App. Ct. 1995). In Atkinson
v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), the court used the equitable parent doctrine
to extend paternity rights and obligations to the petitioner where the child had been born during
the parties' marriage, the petitioner had developed a parental relationship with the child, and
where he had assumed the status of parent. This doctrine was refined in In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), a case involving a lesbian coparent, and followed by
other courts. See, e.g., S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. 2000); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
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2. Equitable Standing of Nonbiological Parents
There are four, sometimes overlapping, equitable principles that
courts have used to find standing: psychological parent, in loco
parentis, de facto' 23  parent, and equitable parent status. A
psychological parent who has taken on all of the responsibilities of
parenthood may be in the best position to care for a child who is not
biologically related to him or her.124  It is also well established in
Illinois that a person standing in loco parentis may claim rights to a
relationship with a child. 125 This is an equitable common law doctrine
that recognizes the parental status of individuals who assume the care
and responsibility for a child, without ever formally adopting the
child.126 Illinois courts have also recognized that individuals can be de
facto parents. 127
When evaluating whether or not an individual is an equitable
parent, courts look to whether the individual intended to assume a
parental role and whether that individual actually carried out parental
duties. 2s The Zazove court noted that "[olne standing in the place of
a parent may give more than material things to that relationship....
Some of the most worth-while, precious and cherished things in one's
life may come therefrom wholly separate and apart from the rights of
support and maintenance.' ' 129 Therefore, courts look to the financial
and disciplinary role that the putative parent has assumed in the
2000).
123. See S.F., 751 A.2d at 9 (permitting visitation by de facto mother).
124. See Rodriguez v. Koschny, 373 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978) (laches precluded
vacation of adoption order, where adoptive parents had become "psychological parents" to the
child); In re Ross, 329 N.E.2d 333, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (recognizing that foster parents who
had cared for the two girls for six and a half years were "psychological parents"); see also
Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (affirming grant of custody to
grandparents who were psychological parents and stood in loco parentis to the child).
125. See Alber v. Ill. Dep't of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (guardians
who did not formally adopt children had standing to assert parental rights); Faber v. Indus.
Comm'n, 185 N.E.255 (Ill. 1933) (couple who did not formally adopt children that they cared for
over thirteen years stood in loco parentis); Fetrow v. Krause, 61 Ill. App. 238 (Ill. App. Ct.
1895); see also Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978) (individual acting in loco parentis
was entitled to show the relationship with child in a hearing on visitation petition).
126. See Zazove v. United States, 156 F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir. 1946) (finding that a deceased
soldier could have assigned National Service insurance Act benefits to woman who stood in
loco parentis); Hawkey v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 941, 944 (E.D. 111. 1952) (affection and
generosity not enough to establish in loco parentis).
127. See, e.g., Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (Il1. App. Ct. 1996); In re Ashley K., 571
N.E.2d 905 (I11. App. 1991).
128. See Hawkey, 108 F. Supp. at 944.
129. Zazove, 156 F.2d at 27.
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child's life, as well as the more intangible aspects of the relationship
between them.
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR ILLINOIS COURTS
While these equitable doctrines are grounded in common law
and Illinois precedent, they have not been extended to lesbian and
gay nonbiological parents seeking custody or visitation. To the
contrary, an Illinois court's recent decision in In re Visitation with
C.B.L.130 specifically prevents a lesbian or gay nonbiological parent
from establishing standing in equity. This holding departs from
equitable standing precedent, from as recently as three years earlier,
in which the court allowed a nonbiological parent to petition for
visitation of the daughter he helped raise. 31 The court's reasoning in
C.B.L. was disingenuous, and failed to explain why common law did
not apply in this case, where a lesbian coparent was involved.
Nevertheless, the decision does not close the door to successful
visitation petitions by nonbiological coparents. The appellate court in
C.B.L. did not consider whether or not a lesbian or gay nonbiological
parent could establish standing under the plain language of section
607(a) of the IMDMA. Further, the court's duty and power to
resolve a family situation not explicitly contemplated by the statute is
well established in equitable standing cases. Considering these issues
together, courts can fashion a consistent approach to standing issues
that protects parents' rights to their children and reflects the actual
families before the court.
A. In re Visitation with C.B.L.
In this case, A.B., the petitioner, and H.L. had been in a
committed relationship for nine years when they had a child together.
The women agreed that H.L. would bear the child through artificial
insemination and that A.B. would financially support the family. As
the court noted, "[p]etitioner was dutifully involved in all of the
preparations prior to the birth. She was also equally involved in the
care of C.B.L. for the next year-and-a-half.' 13 2  A.B. and H.L.
separated when their daughter was nearly two, and agreed to a
visitation schedule, with H.L. retaining physical custody of the child.
130. 723 N.E.2d 316 (IM. App. Ct. 1999).
131. See Koelle, 672 N.E.2d at 868.
132. C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 317.
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Within a year of the separation, H.L. moved to Illinois with the baby
and refused to allow A.B. any further contact.13
A.B. sought visitation of the child, but her petition was denied
for lack of standing.1 4 She brought the petition under section 607 and
also requested any other equitable relief available. 3 5 The circuit
court specifically held that common law did not apply. The appellate
court affirmed dismissal, finding that A.B. had conceded that she
lacked standing under section 607.136 It also held that the provisions
of IMDMA had eliminated the common law and, therefore,
precluded A.B. from establishing common law standing as a de facto
parent or a person standing in loco parentis 37
B. Standing Based in Equity
The C.B.L. court allied itself with courts that have explicitly
refused to recognize the equitable standing of lesbian or gay
nonbiological parents to seek visitation. 38 Courts rejecting equitable
visitation standing claim that they may not broadly interpret existing
statutes to include nonbiological lesbian or gay parents, and instead
must defer to the legislature. 39 In addition, they argue that it is the
legislature's prerogative to broaden the description of people who are
"parents," and it is not within the judge's discretion to make those
determinations.140
The C.B.L. court did not attempt to distinguish, or even address,
any of the Illinois cases extending standing to nonbiological parents
seeking visitation or custody.14' Instead, the court focused on the
transformation of grandparent standing from a common law doctrine
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. A.B. focused her appeal on common law standing and did not argue standing under
section 607. Id. at 321. ("That concession is dispositive of this appeal.").
137. See id.; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (1999).
138. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
lesbian coparent had no standing to seek custody or visitation); Lynda A.H. v. Diane T.O., 673
N.Y.S.2d 1989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999);
Fowler v. Jones, 969 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1998) (reversing appellate court ruling that nonbiological
mother had standing to seek visitation).
139. See, e.g., Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (recognizing that the legislature
had not explicitly granted visitation rights to lesbian coparent who had not adopted children,
but declining to adopt equitable standing principles).
140. See, e.g., Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 1600 (Cal. 1990); Thompson, 11
S.W.3d at 918.
141. See C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 318; see also supra Part III.B.
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to its incorporation in section 607(b).142 Based on this development,
the court concluded that the Illinois legislature intended to abolish
common law standing as applied to section 607.143 Section 607 has
evolved significantly during its twenty-year history, as the court
noted. 44 Yet, the court did not declare the abolition of common law
standing until a lesbian coparent sought visitation of her child.
This position is untenable because it leaves absolutely no
recourse for nonbiological parents to maintain relationships with their
children. If the legislature refuses to explicitly extend parental rights
to a class of parents based on their sexual orientation, the court
cannot avoid its duty to resolve the issue in light of the best interests
of the child.
[W]e have ... recognized that [wihen social mores change,
governing statutes must be interpreted to allow for those changes in
a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind their
enactment. To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class,
the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second
parent serves no legitimate state interest. 145
It is inappropriate and shortsighted for the judiciary to defer to
legislative authority where the legislature has failed to address a dire
situation affecting children in the state. 46 The purpose of a court's
equitable power is to fashion common sense remedies that will fairly
and adequately address the issues before the court. Further, as
parens patriae, the state is obligated to protect the interests of its
children. Regardless of whether there is sufficient public approval of
families created by lesbian and gay Americans to generate specific
legislation addressing their family relationships, the courts must not
abandon their duties., 7 The rapid expansion in this area of family
142. See C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 318. Very recently, an Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a
heterosexual nonbiological father's standing to seek visitation, based on the consent of the
mother. See Donath v. Buckley, No. 3-00-0398, 2001 WL 178484 (I11. App. Ct. Feb. 20, 2001).
143. See C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d at 320.
144. See id.
145. V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (Wecker, J., concurring
in part; dissenting in part).
146. At least two other courts have exercised jurisdiction over custody and visitation
disputes between lesbians who have separated after coparenting a child. See Gestl v. Frederick,
754 A.2d 1087 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Barnae v. Barnae, 943 P.2d 1036, 1041 (N.M. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 942 P.2d 189 (N.M. 1997). In each case, after the petition was brought, the
biological mother moved from a state that recognized some form of equitable standing back to
her former resident state, which did not afford custody or visitation to nonbiological parents.
The courts exercised jurisdiction, finding that the courts in Tennessee and California,
respectively, did not provide adequate protection to the nonbiological parents' constitutional
rights.
147. See, for example, In re Guardianship of Olivia J., 84 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1162 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000), where the court stated:
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law148 indicates that these issues will continue to be brought before the
Illinois courts and others. Developing a consistent approach to
standing that critically examines the family structure before the court
will ensure that all children may maintain relationships with their
actual parents, so long as it is in their best interests.
Courts in other states have extended equitable standing to
nonbiological parents seeking visitation.149 Standing is determined by
focusing on the nature and the extent of the actual relationship
between the individual and the child.150  Courts recognizing the
standing of nonbiological parents to seek visitation have referred to
the variety of forms taken by modern families.' 5' What then, is the
difference between a lesbian or gay coparent and a stepparent? If
both the biological and nonbiological parent planned, created, and
fostered the family together, the lesbian or gay coparent presents a
stronger basis to establish equitable standing for visitation. 52
Perhaps the repetition of this unfortunate scenario, in case after case, in which the
appellant unsuccessfully avails herself of legal remedies not designed to suit the factual
circumstances, will eventually lead to a legislative solution, if for no other reason than
to protect the children involved from becoming pawns in the conflict of the adults who
care for them.
148. See Mary L. Bonauto, Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, De Facto
Parenthood: Legal Foundations and Modest Proposals for Future Litigation, paper prepared for
MBA Nontraditional Family Program (Sept. 13, 2000) (reviewing application and development
of equitable parent principles in Massachusetts).
149. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (lesbian coparent entitled to
visitation of child); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (former partner of lesbian biological
mother was entitled to visitation); T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding
that former partner had standing to seek visitation based on in loco parentis status and ordering
remand for best interests hearing).
150. See id.
151. Indeed, the C.B.L. Court acknowledged this, even as it deferred to the legislature: "This
court is not unmindful of the fact that our evolving social structures have created non-traditional
relationships." 723 N.E.2d at 321. Similarly, in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens stated:
The almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-changing
society strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that
treats a biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her child as anisolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily. It is indisputably the business of the
States, rather than a federal court employing a national standard, to assess in the first
instance the relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes
such as this.
530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
152. See Kimberly P. Carr, Comment, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests
of the Child in a Nontraditional Family, 58 BROOK, L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1992) (citations
omitted).
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C. Section 607(a) of the IMDMA
As set forth earlier, section 607(a) of the IMDMA states that "a
parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights." '153 The statute does
not define who qualifies as a parent. Courts that have narrowly
construed the term require a biological link between the parent and
child. They are reluctant to stray from a strict biological link because
of the fear that any number of individuals, from the babysitter, to "a
cult group,' 1 4 could claim to be parents entitled to custody or
visitation. In the second-parent adoption context, an Illinois
appellate court responded to this implausible argument by reminding
the circuit court that it remains empowered to determine whether or
not granting the petition serves the best interests of the child. 5
Moreover, Illinois courts have already recognized that a parent
can be someone other than a biological parent . 5 6 On at least two
occasions, individuals were found to be parents for standing purposes
under section 601 and 607(a).57 In each case, a putative father whose
paternity was not rebutted when he first sought custody was
considered a parent for standing purposes, even though he was later
proven not to be the biological father. 8
The C.B.L. court's decision leaves open the possibility of
extending standing to a lesbian or gay nonbiological parent under
section 607. In affirming, the court emphasized A.B.'s decision not to
pursue her 607 claim on appeal.1 9 The court's position on equitable
standing was clear in this case. On the other hand, its position on
A.B.'s standing under section 607 was far from clear. Same-sex
marriages are not recognized in Illinois,' 6° so nonbiological parents
have no recourse under the traditional IMDMA dissolution rules.
Without an adoptive link, lesbian or gay nonbiological parents in
Illinois have no legal protection of their relationships with their
children. Recognizing lesbian or gay coparents as "parents" for
standing purposes of either section 601 or 607 would remedy a serious
problem for this class of nonbiological parents.
153. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a) (2000).
154. See In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
155. See id.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See In re Marriage of Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344, 1344 (111. App. Ct. 1995); In re
Marriage of Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
158. See id.
159. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
160. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212.
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
Inclusion of lesbian or gay coparents under section 607(a) would
also provide guidance to courts and families created by same-sex
couples. Common law equitable doctrines such as de facto parent
and in loco parentis provide solid rationale for recognizing coparents'
standing to seek visitation. However, relying on equity leaves too
much room for inconsistency and subjectivity of standing
determinations. Moreover, since C.B.L. specifically eliminated the
option of standing based in equity, lesbian or gay nonbiological
parents are left with no other basis for standing.
Extending "parental" standing under the IMDMA to lesbian and
gay coparents recognizes the reality of millions of parents and
children. 6' It will also give notice to lesbian or gay biological parents
that they must honor their families, even when they divorce.
Coparenting agreements may remain unenforceable, but they can be
used to demonstrate that a nonbiological parent has standing to seek
visitation.
D. Proposed Guidelines
A United States Supreme Court Justice has said that "parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring.' 1 62 Yet courts return to biology because they do not know
how to limit the number of people claiming to be parents. These
fears can be allayed. Families deliberately created by same-sex
couples are identifiable and distinct from unrelated third parties. If
the constitutional protection accorded to nuclear families remains a
fundamental right for all families, then courts must look to the actual
family before them.
Courts recognizing the standing of nonbiological parents to seek
visitation have referred to the variety of forms taken by modern
families. 163 They have engaged in a fact specific inquiry into the
relationship between the child and the nonbiological parent.
With the best interests of children in mind, courts can follow a
consistent approach to standing issues in visitation disputes between
161. See Andersen, supra note 2, at 935.
162. Caban v. Mohammed, 442 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring).
163. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (Wecker, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part) ("In my view, granting V.C. visitation and remanding for
reconsideration of custody would effect a reasonable application of existing statutes and
common law to reality; families today take many forms, and we must protect all relationships
between parents and children.").
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same-sex coparents. A two-part test may be used to determine
whether the person seeking visitation is a "parent" for standing
purposes. First, courts should look to the facts reflected by testimony,
parenting agreements, and the history of the relationship between the
biological parent and the person seeking visitation. If the facts show
that there is both a significant relationship between the child and the
nonbiological parent, and prior biological parental knowledge of and
fostering of that relationship, then the nonbiological parent will have
met the threshold requirement of parenthood.164  Courts have
adopted this approach when examining the standing of other
nonbiological parents. 165 It allows the court to adhere to the statutory
requirement of standing and reflects a critical inquiry into the family
structure before the court. This approach can be used with either
lesbians or gay men seeking visitation with their children.
Proving a significant relationship may be difficult. This will be
especially true where, as in C.B.L., the couple separated when the
child was an infant. How will the court determine if a relationship is
significant? One approach would be to look at the extent of the
nonbiological parent's interactions with the child. If he or she shared
all primary responsibilities for the child, i.e., feeding, clothing,
bathing, playing, doctor visits, investing in the child's education, then
those facts should weigh in favor of a significant relationship,
regardless of the child's age when the parents separate. Considering
these issues, along with the second part of the threshold test, will
ensure that only legitimate parents have standing under 607(a) and
601.
After the threshold visitation standing requirements have been
met, courts may apply the traditional best interests standard. In its
analysis, the court should consider the interests of the child, the
nonbiological parent's interests, and the social interest in protecting
and maintaining stable relationships between parents and their
164. See In re Marriage of Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (affirming a
nonbiological father's visitation rights, even though he did not appear to be a parent within the
language of section 607); Boyles v. Boyles, 466 N.Y.S.2d 762, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (ruling
that a biological mother was estopped from denying paternity of a nonbiological father when
she had fostered and encouraged a relationship between child and father); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (lesbian coparent allowed visitation because the
biological mother had fostered a relationship with the child).
165. The American Law Institute has proposed a similar approach. See PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.203-2.21 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, Apr. 1, 2000, adopted May 16,2000).
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children. 166 One author has suggested that these three classes of
interests converge to form the standards that create a legal
relationship between a child and an adult. 67 These distinct interests
frame the author's evaluation of the legal standards used by courts in
custody and visitation determinations.' 61 Because "[v]isitation is a
considerably less weighty matter than outright custody of a child, and
does not demand the enhanced protections ... that attend custody
awards,' 69 Illinois courts should equally protect all three interests in
disputes over the visitation rights of lesbian or gay nonbiological
parents. Therefore, a court presented with a custody or visitation
dispute between Elijah and Alicia's mothers must consider the
benefits of returning the children to the home and community they
have lived in for their entire lives; the children's interests in regular
contact and visitation with both of the parents who raised them;70 and
the interests of each parent-regardless of biology-in preserving the
family they have created.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary American families are, more often than not,
created outside of traditional heterosexual marital relationships.
When the relationships between the parents change, whether through
divorce, legal separation, or mutual decision, courts have a
responsibility to maintain and protect the relationships between
children and their parents. Families created by lesbian and gay
parents should not be accorded less protection than those created in a
traditional heterosexual marriage.
Therefore, Illinois courts should include lesbian and gay
nonbiological parents under section 607(a) and section 601 of the
166. See H.S.H.-K., 533 N.w.2d at 419; GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS ET
AL., supra note 37.
167. See Andersen, supra note 2, at 935.
168. Although his conceptual framework is useful, I disagree with the author's conclusions
about same-sex partners of biological parents, and their rights to children. Andersen believes
that marriage-which is an exclusively heterosexual institution-must be an essential part of the
social interest. See id. at 997. To bolster his theory, he minimizes studies revealing high divorce
rates among heterosexual couples and instead emphasizes a frequently debunked report about
the sexual relationships of gay men. See id. at 988, 994. While I would agree that heterosexual
marriage is one element of the social intcrest, it is by no means the only actual and legitimate
form of family structure in modern America.
169. Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A.2d 30, 40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (quoting Fairbanks
v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (Md. 1993)).
170. In his dissent in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens explicitly recognized children's
interests in maintaining their familial relationships with individuals who are not their biological
parents. See 530 U.S. 57, 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IMDMA. Courts can engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine
whether a lesbian or gay person petitioning for visitation qualifies as a
parent for standing purposes. The most relevant considerations are
the nature and quality of the relationship between the petitioner and
the child, and whether the biological parent fostered and developed
that relationship. By engaging in this inquiry, courts may adhere to
the statutory requirement for standing.
Regardless of whether the legislature decides to redraft the
statutory standing requirements of the IMDMA, the Adoption Act,
or the Juvenile Court Act, courts have an inherent authority to act in
the best interests of the child. The two part threshold test allows
courts to make a genuine best interests determination. By adopting
this standard, courts will serve the convergence of interests: the
interests of the parent petitioning for visitation, the interests of the
child in maintaining a relationship with his or her parent, and the
social interests in fostering and preserving family relationships. With
this approach, neither equity nor the best interests of children will be
abandoned.

